Terrorism Incident Annex

Coordinating Agency

Mississippi Department of Public Safety
Mississippi Office of Homeland Security

Cooperating Agencies

Mississippi Emergency Management
Mississippi Department of Health
Mississippi Military Department
Mississippi Military Department (47 CST)
MDEQ
All State Agencies as necessary

Federal Coordinating Agencies

Federal Bureau of Investigations
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Justice

Federal Cooperating Agencies

Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of State
Environmental Protection Agency
All Federal Agencies as necessary

Introduction

Purpose

This annex sets forth the concept of operations for preventing, responding and recovering from all threats or acts of terrorism within the state, regardless of whether they are deemed credible and/or whether they escalate to an Incident of State Significance. To accomplish this, the annex establishes a structure for a systematic, coordinated, unified, timely, and effective state response to threats or acts of terrorism within the state.

Scope

This annex supports the Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) and:

- Provides guidance and outlines operational concepts for the state response to a threatened or actual terrorist incident within the state.
- Acknowledges and outlines the unique nature of each threat or incident. This annex addresses direction, coordination, operations for response as well as throughout the recovery/investigation phases of an incident.
- Outlines the capabilities and responsibilities of the local jurisdictions, and the law enforcement and investigative activities necessary to prevent or mitigate a specific threat or incident.

Policies

The State of Mississippi regards terrorism as a potential threat to state security, as well as a violent criminal act, and applies all appropriate means to combat this danger. In doing so, the state vigorously pursues efforts to deter and preemt these crimes and to apprehend and prosecute directly, or assist other agencies in prosecuting, individuals who perpetrate or plan terrorist attacks.
To ensure the policies established in applicable Gubernatorial directives are implemented in a coordinated manner, this annex provides overall guidance to local agencies concerning the State Government’s response to potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents that occur in the State, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE) material.

**Deployment/Employment Priorities**

In addition to the priorities identified in the CEMP, response to terrorist threats or incidents within the state is based on the following priorities:

- Preserving life or minimizing risk to health which constitutes the first priority of operations.
- Preventing a threatened act from being carried out or an existing terrorist act from being expanded or aggravated.
- Locating, accessing, safe rendering, controlling, containing, recovering, or disposing of a WMD that has not yet functioned, and disposing of CBRNE material in coordination with appropriate departments and agencies.
- Apprehending and successfully prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist threats or incidents.

**Planning Assumptions and Considerations**

In addition to the planning assumptions and considerations identified in the CEMP Basic Plan, the response to terrorist threat or incident, particularly those involving WMD/CBRNE material, are based on the following assumptions and considerations:

- A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning, may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may result in mass casualties.
- The suspected or actual involvement of terrorists adds a complicating dimension to incident management.
- The response to a threat or actual incident involves local, state, and federal law enforcement to provide an investigative element to such activity.
- In the case of a threat, there may be no incident site and no external consequences, and therefore, there may be no need for establishment of traditional Incident Command System (ICS) elements such as an Incident Command Post (ICP) or a Joint Field Office (JFO).
- An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the state involving chemical biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive materials, will have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of many local governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing state response capabilities.
- In the case of a biological attack, the effect may be temporally and geographically dispersed, without a determined or defined “incident site.” Response operations may be conducted over a multi-jurisdictional, multi-state region.
- A biological attack employing a contagious agent may require quarantine by state, local, and tribal health officials to contain the disease outbreak.
If appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and capabilities are not available and the area is contaminated with CBRNE or other hazardous materials, it is possible that response actions into a contaminated area may be delayed until the material has dissipated to a level that is safe for emergency response personnel to operate or until appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities arrive, whichever is sooner.

**Situation**

The complexity, scope, and potential consequences of a terrorist threat or incident require that there be a rapid and decisive capability to resolve the situation. The resolution to an act of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination of law enforcement, criminal investigation, protective activities, emergency management functions, and technical expertise across all levels of government. The incident may affect a single location or multiple locations, each of which may be an incident scene, a hazardous scene, and/or a crime scene simultaneously.

**Concept of Operations**

**Command and Control**

The Mississippi Department of Public Safety/Office of Homeland Security (MDPS/OHS) will serve as the lead agency for terrorist acts or terrorist threats and intelligence collection activities within the state. Investigative and intelligence activities are managed by the MOHS/MDPS/Mississippi Bureau of Investigations (MBI) in conjunction with local effected law enforcement and the local Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) from a Joint Command Post (JCP) or Joint Operations Center (JOC). The command post or JOC coordinates the necessary assets required to respond to and resolve the threat or incident with state and local law enforcement agencies.

The lead agency will establish a forward command post to manage the threat based upon a graduated and flexible response. This command post structure generally consists of three functional groups: Command, Operations, and Operations Support, and is designed to accommodate participation of other agencies, as appropriate.

If the terrorist threat or incident which has involved a WMD or CBRNE material exceeds the capabilities and resources of the state, local, tribal and/or local FBI, additional assistance from regional and national assets will be requested to augment existing capabilities.

When, an actual terrorist incident has occurred, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) becomes the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO). Joint operations are still conducted between local, state and federal assets. In this situation, the JOC Consequence Management Group is incorporated into the appropriate components of the JFO.
Command Group

- Incident Command (IC) will be established at the scene of the incident and will be supported by the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). The on-scene IC will provide command and control structure for the incident by providing leadership for the incident at the incident site.

- The Joint Information Center (JIC) Team is integrated into the IC structure when established. It is composed of the public affairs (media) officers from the participating local, state, and federal public safety agencies. It manages information released to the public through a coordinated, unified approach. The JIC provides specific guidance and expertise to the IC and SEOC and coordinates to ensure the media strategy is consistent with the overall investigative strategy.

Operations Group

- The Operations Group handles all investigative, intelligence, and operational functions related to the threat, critical incident, or special event.

- Each local, state, and federal unit within the Operations Group provides expertise in specific functional areas. These areas are important in the overall resolution of an incident.

- The units within the Operations Group are scalable and may be tailored to a specific threat, critical incident, or special event. Tailoring may be based on equipment and expertise.

- The Operations Group will consist of an Information/Intelligence unit, an Investigations unit, and a Field Operations unit(s).

Information/Intelligence unit

- Information/Intelligence unit is the central point for receiving all information and intelligence that comes into the Incident Command Post. This unit will consist of intelligence analysts from the Mississippi Analysis and Information Center (MSAIC) and the FBI - Jackson Field Intelligence Group (FIG) in a joint effort between the FBI and the state. The Intelligence Unit is divided into two primary sections Information and Intelligence. The purpose of the Information Section is to ensure that telephone calls, e-mail messages, fax reports, and other incoming information are assessed for relevance to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The information is checked to determine if it has been previously reported. It is prioritized and entered into an information management system. Through this filtering mechanism the Information Section ensures that only current and relevant information is disseminated to the Incident Command Staff.

- The Intelligence Unit manages the collection, analysis, archiving, and dissemination of relevant and valid investigative and strategic intelligence.

- The Intelligence Section usually is divided into teams based on functional responsibility. Teams manage intelligence related to the crisis site or target and build intelligence portfolios.

- The Information/Intelligence Coordinator is responsible for providing guidance and direction to all personnel within the Information/Intelligence Unit and coordinating the activities of the unit with all other units within the Incident. Personnel within the Information Intelligence Unit are responsible for receiving incoming information, processing new information, routing follow-up information
appropriately, and implementing procedures for tracking evidentiary material that is introduced into
the command post.

- The Information/Intelligence Unit will maintain databases on significant elements related to the
  investigation (subjects, vehicles, and organizations), analyze and identify trends in activities related to
  the investigation (predictive and strategic intelligence), conduct liaison with outside members of the
  Intelligence Community, and prepare periodic briefings and reports concerning the status of the crisis
  or investigation. The Intelligence unit is responsible for collecting and reviewing all intelligence
  related to the threat, crisis, or special event to enable the state to further develop and refine strategic
  objectives.

Investigations

- The Investigations Unit provides oversight and direction to all investigative activity related to the threat,
  critical incident, or special event. The Investigations Unit implements the strategy of the Special
  Agent in Charge (SAC) by directing the collection and management of investigative information. It is
  composed of investigative personnel from the agencies with specific jurisdiction or authority for
  investigating crimes related to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Investigations Unit
  Coordinator is usually a supervisory investigator who has responsibility for investigating the most
  significant substantive law violation.

- Teams within the Investigations Unit review all incoming information to determine investigative
  value. The Investigations Unit assigns, tracks, and reviews all investigative leads and documents the
  investigation in the appropriate case file(s). The case agents or primary investigators within the
  Investigations Unit manage all evidence and information, and prepare it for court presentation, if
  appropriate. The case agents or primary investigators are assisted by analytical personnel to ensure
  that all investigative information is pursued to its logical conclusion. A Records Check Team within
  the Investigations Unit reviews case files and databases to ensure that all items of investigative value are
  identified and evaluated. The Investigations Unit is responsible for collecting and reviewing all reports
  of investigative activity to enable the SAC to further develop and refine strategic objectives.

Field Operations

- The Field Operations Units are based upon the specific needs of the threat, critical incident, or special
  event. The personnel staffing these units are subject-matter experts in a number of specialized skill
  areas. Field Operations Unit Coordinators are responsible for ensuring the activity of the specialized
  units is consistent with and in support of the strategy of the Incident Command.

- Field Operations units may include representatives of tactical, negotiations, WMD/CBRNE, evidence
  response, surveillance, technical, or any other specialized unit deployed to the crisis site(s) or staged in
  readiness. The mission of these units is to provide the Incident Commander with current information
  and specialized assistance in dealing with the threat, critical incident, or special event. Information is
  communicated between the ICP and the crisis site(s) through the Field Operations Unit
  representatives in the Incident Command Post and SEOC. This ensures that decision makers both in
  the SEOC and in the forward areas maintain full situational awareness. The Field Operations Units
  coordinate their activities to ensure each is aware of the impact of their activities on the other field
  units.

- Local, state, and federal law enforcement specialty units assigned to assist with field operations
during the threat, incident, or special event coordinate their activities with the appropriate Field
  Operations Units. The Joint Operations Center manages the activities of the specialized units at a
strategic level. Activities at the individual or “tactical” level are managed at the crisis site(s) through forward command structures such as the Tactical Operations Center, Negotiations Operations Center, and Evidence Response Team Operations Center.

**Operations Support Group**

- The Operations Support Units designated within the JOC/SEOC ICP are based upon the specific needs of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The personnel who staff these units are subject-matter experts in a number of specialized areas. Operations Support Coordinators are responsible for ensuring the activity of their units is consistent with and in support of the strategy of the Incident Commander and Command Structure.

- Operations Support Units can include administrative, logistics, legal, media, liaison, communications, and information management. The mission of these units is to support the investigative, intelligence, and operational functions of the Incident Command.

- A Communications Unit may be established to handle radio and telephone communications to support incident operations. The Communications Unit establishes communications networks. It also establishes networks to facilitate timely and reliable information-sharing between the IC/SEOC and other command and control centers.

- The Information Technology Unit is responsible for computer system operation within each unit and between units. Information Technology Specialists are responsible for ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the information management system used during operations.

**The Response**

- Receipt of a terrorist threat may be through any source or medium and may be articulated or developed through intelligence sources. It is the responsibility of all local, state, and federal agencies and departments to notify the FBI when such a threat is received. As explained below, the FBI evaluates the credibility of the terrorist threat and notifies the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and other departments and agencies, as appropriate.

- Upon receipt of a threat of terrorism within Mississippi, state, local and tribal, and federal agencies along with the FBI will conduct a formal threat credibility assessment in support of operations with assistance from select interagency experts. For a WMD or CBRNE threat, this assessment includes three perspectives:
  - Technical Feasibility- An assessment of the capacity of the threatening individual or organization to obtain or produce the material at issue;
  - Operational Practicability- An assessment of the feasibility of delivering or employing the material in the manner threatened; and
  - Behavioral Resolve- A psychological assessment of the likelihood that the subject(s) will carry out the threat, including a review of any written or verbal statement by the subject(s).

- A threat assessment is conducted to determine whether the potential threat is credible, and confirm whether WMD or CBRNE materials are involved in the developing terrorist incident. Intelligence varies with each threat and impacts the level of the response. If the threat is credible, the situation requires the tailoring of response actions to use federal resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve the
situation. The state response focuses on actions taken in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is predominantly concerned with preventing and resolving the threat. In addition, contingency planning focuses on the response to potential consequences and the positioning of regional resources. The threat increases in significance when the presence of a CBRNE device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or loss, is confirmed or when intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists. In this case, the threat has developed into a WMD or CBRNE terrorist situation requiring an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of state resources to augment local authorities in lessening or averting the potential consequence of terrorist use or employment of WMD or CBRNE material. It should be noted that a threat assessment would also be conducted if an incident occurs without warning. In this case, the assessment is focused on criminal intent, the extent of the threat, and the likelihood of secondary devices or locations.

- The FBI manages a Terrorist Threat Warning System to ensure that vital information regarding terrorism reaches those in the U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement community responsible for countering terrorist threats. This information is coordinated with MOHS/MSAIC.

- The FBI leads the criminal investigation related to an actual confirmed terrorism incident, and the FBI - Jackson Field Intelligence Group (FIG) along with the State Fusion Center (MSAIC) and the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) are the focal points for all intelligence related to the investigative law enforcement response to the incident. Consistent with the state CEMP and the Federal NRF, affected state and federal agencies operate emergency operations centers, as necessary. State and federal law enforcement initiates appropriate liaison with other state and federal agencies to activate their operations centers and provide liaison officers.

- The Incident Commander (IC) establishes initial operational priorities based upon the specific circumstances of the threat or incident. This information is then forwarded to State and Federal Emergency Operations Centers to coordinate identification and deployment of appropriate resources.

- Once a terrorism incident is confirmed a JOC is established by the FBI under the operational control of the FBI SAC, with assistance from the state and will act as the focal point for the field coordination of criminal investigation, law enforcement, and intelligence activities related to the threat or incident. When a Principal Federal Official (PFO) is designated for a terrorism incident, the FBI SAC provides full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support to the PFO, as appropriate and consistent with applicable authorities. The PFO (or an initial PFO designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security) may elect to use the JOC as an initial operating facility for strategic management and identification of state, local, and tribal requirements and priorities, and coordination of the federal response. The FBI SAC coordinates with the PFO, including providing incident information to the PFO as requested, coordinating the public communications strategy with the PFO, and approving federal interagency communications for release to the public through the PFO. It is recognized, however, that in some cases it may be necessary for the FBI SAC to respond directly to media/public inquiries on investigative operations and matters affecting law enforcement operations, particularly during the early stages of the emergency response.

- The local FBI Field Office activates a Crisis Management Team to establish the JOC in the affected area, possibly collocated with an existing emergency operations facility. In locating the JOC, consideration is given to the possibility that the facility may have to accommodate other federal incident management field activities including the JFO, the JIC, and other supporting teams. Additionally, the JOC is augmented by outside agencies, including representatives from a Federal Emergency Response Team (ERT) (if deployed), who provide interagency technical expertise as well
as interagency continuity during the transition from an FBI command post structure to the JOC structure.

- Based upon a credible threat assessment and a request by the SAC, the FBI Director and DHS Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security, may request authorization through the National Security Council to deploy the (ERT) to assist in mitigating the crisis situation. The ERT is a rapidly deployable, interagency team responsible for providing expert advice and support concerning the Federal Government’s capabilities in resolving the terrorist threat or incident. This includes law enforcement, criminal investigation, and emergency management assistance, technical and scientific advice, and contingency planning guidance tailored to situations involving chemical, biological, or nuclear/radiological weapons.

- Upon arrival at the FBI command post or JOC, the ERT may act as a stand-alone advisory team to the SAC providing recommended courses of action. Although it would be unusual, the DEST may be tasked to deploy before a JOC is established. The ERT may handle some of the specialized interagency functions of the JOC until the JOC is fully staffed. The ERT emergency management component merges into the existing Incident Command Structure (ICS) in the JOC structure.

- Prior to an actual WMD or CBRNE incident, law enforcement, intelligence, and investigative activities generally have priority. When an incident results in the use of WMD or CBRNE material, rescue and life-safety activities generally have priority. Multiple activities and agencies’ duties may overlap and/or run concurrently during the incident management, and are dependent on the threat and/or the strategies for responding to the incident.

- Upon determination that applicable law enforcement/intelligence goals and objectives are met and no further immediate threat exists, the FBI SAC may deactivate the JOC and order a return to routine law enforcement/investigative operations in accordance with pre-event protocols.

- When an incident occurs and an ICP is established on-scene, FBI personnel integrate into the ICP to enhance the abilities of the state and local agencies to carry out mission. Three specific positions within an ICP are provided. The first FBI Special Agent (SA) or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) member responding receives an initial briefing from the Incident Commander or his/her designee and works closely with the Incident Commander as a member of the Unified Command. The FBI representative then informs the local Field Office of the current situation and, if necessary, requests additional assets. When a more senior FBI SA arrives on the scene, he/she assumes the role of the FBI representative in the Unified Command.

- When an incident occurs and an ICP is established on-scene, MOHS personnel integrate into the ICP to assist with their deployment of state assets equipped and trained to assist with a Terrorism Incident. DPS/MOHS receives an initial briefing from the Incident Commander or his/her designee and works closely with the Incident Commander as a member of the Unified Command. The DPS/MOHS representative then informs the SEOC and the Director of MS Office of Homeland Security of the current situation and, if necessary, requests additional assets.

- When an incident requires the deployment of the National Asset Response Unit (NARU) to assist with WMD terrorism incidents the state will assist FBI- Jackson Division in supporting the NARU deployment and convoy operations.

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• Operational control of assets at the scene is retained by the designated officials representing the agency (local, state, or federal) providing the assets.

• Actual Field Operations Guides (FOG’s) are deemed sensitive security information based on their detailed account of field operating procedures, detection and identification methods.

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**Review and Maintenance**

As a minimum, the state agency contact will coordinate and conduct an annual review of this annex with all support agencies. Additional reviews may be conducted if experience with an incident or regulatory changes indicate a need. Recommendations for change will be submitted to MEMA for approval, publication, and distribution.